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Moral Responsibility:
A Story, an Argument, and a Vision
Stephen J. J'v!orse

The concept of moral responsibility and associated concepts and practices, such as human
agency, praise, and blame. play an undeniably importan t part in our li ves. But what does it
mean to be a morally respon sible person-an agen t that can fairly be praised and blamed,
rewarded and punished. for one 's intentional actions') Many people look for a sec ure
foundation to ground concepts as important to us as re sponsibility. Most notable among the
seekers are th eologian s and sec ular metaphysicians, who try to justify responsibility with
speculations and arguments about the divine or ultimate reaso n. r am unconvincecl by th ese
accounts , however, and believe that no ultimate. uncontroversial justification can be found.
There is simply no way to kn ow about the exi sten ce of God or the genuine ontology of the
uni ve rse . What is more di squietin g, if we were con vinced th at God or metaphysical moral
reality exi sted . such a conclusion would not lead to uncontroversial concrete answers to the
specific qu esti ons of morals and politics that vex human life. For example, even if we agree
th at in principle th ere are ontol ogically correct answers to every moral question , does this tell
us clearly whether. say. th e death penalty or abortion is ever justified? On ep istemological
grounds al one , then . if found ation s ex ist, we will neve r know that we have reached rock
bottom.
J will offer instead a story. an argument, and a vi sion abou t how moral responsibility is
possibl e and why it is desirable. My ac count is an expl icitly internal interpretati on and
defe nse of our present moral respo nsibility co ncepts and prac tices. Re sponsibility and its
practices. like the co nc ept of law and legal institutions. are products of human culture and can
only be justiti ed by the tools of justification that a particular cu lture provides. Although
cultural products. including theories of knowledge and justifi ca ti on. ma y be te mporall y and
geographi call y di ve rse. they are none th eless as real features of our lives as gravity and death,
and they can be rati onall y analy ze d. To give an internaL constructivist account docs not
commit one to '·an ything goes·' relati vism or to unfettered pragmati sm. We can assess the
quality of the reasons that support moral responsibility. ancl I suggest that res pons ibility is
both co herent and desirabl e. fncleed, our li ves and society wouicl be impove ri shed without it.
eve n if it were possibl e to give it up. which I doubt.
I begin th e story at th e beginning. Once upon a time the univers e bega n. [ am agnostic
about cosmo logy. but any secular the ory will do. For convenie nc e. let us ass ume that in the
beginning was the '·big bang," as a re sult of which the uni ve rse could have been composed of
matter or anti-matter. fn the event, it turned out to be matter. Then a very great deal of physical
lifting and haulin g took place over a very lon g time. Now. thi s process was and is entirel y
governed by the ph ys ical laws of the uni ve rse . This thought is expressed ni cely in Bernard
Malamud' s noveL Pictures ()/ Fide/man.' A light bulb begins to speak in li ght to the
protagoni st, Fic!elman. and gives him advi ce . Fidelman asks for gu idance to follow the advice
and th e bulb says . .. l will show yo u th e way but f can ·t go with yo u. Up to a point but not
further if yo u know what I mean. A bulb is a bulb. Light I go t but not fee t. After aiL thi s is the
Universe . eve rything is laws ." All those laws operated upon all th at matter to produce those
features of the universe that have existed in the past. that ex ist now. and that will ex ist in the
future. Among th ese feature s is our planet. Earth. on which tho se physical processes
ul timately produced organic. biological life form s.
Those life form s evol ved into wo ndrously di ve rse crea tures. so me of which . including
ourse lves. are '·social'' animal s. To th e best of our knowledge. the soc ial life of mos t of these
creatures. eve n hi ghl y compl ex form s, operates entirely. or alm os t entirely. '· in stinctually ...
That is. primarily the genetic code pro vides these creatures with a repertoire of socia l

Tru11sgressiml, PulliShlll enr. Rcspm1si!Jilin·. Forgi1 ·eness
Gul\·en lnwges 4 ( l998 ). 73 -80.

Moral Res pon sibility

organi zation and behavior that is not self-consciously eva luated. adopted. or rev ised by those
creatures . Human beings are not only social. however. Evoluti on has also endowed us with
self-consciou sness and th e capacity for reason. "Instinct" may motivate our sociability. but
compared to other creatures on thi s planet. it puts onl y the loosest limits on the forms that
sociability takes. Am ong the species that inhabit our planet. only human be ings act sel fconsci ously for reaso ns and live in societi es gove rned by behav ior- guiding norm s that are
used in practical reasonin g. We are the onl y creatures whose behavi or is reason-responsive .
This means th at we are the only creatures to whom the qu estion s. "Wh y did you do th at?" and
·'How should we behave')" can properly be addressed an d an swered with reaso ns. To the bes t
of our knowledge. onl y human beings kill each other as a res ult of di sputes about the answers
to such que stions.
How could it be otherwise'J Sociable. self-co nscious creatures th at reason have a lot of
work to do if they are to live together at all successfully . They will need norm s to guide their
interac tions. Many of the se norm s may simply solve ubiquitous coordin atio n problems. But
not all norm s sol ve only these probl ems. For exa mple. norm s about when it is acceptabl e to
kill an other human being involve more than simple coordinati on problems. The norms may
be temporall y and geographi call y di verse and differenti al importance may att ach to similar
norm s in different times and places. but norms there mu st be for creatures such as oursel ves .
lt is nearly impossible to imagine a society that we could inte lligibl y con sider human that
ex isted without norm s.
No rms in turn create in peopl e mutual expectations of each other th at vary in strength and
importance. Incleecl. we are probabl y the onl y creatures on Earth that consci o usly have
normati ve expec tati ons of each other and th at make evalu ati ve judgments when those
expectation s are sati sfied or breach ed. Normative judgment appears to be an o mniprese nt and
uniqu e feature of human social ex istence . An interes tin g fea ture of human nonnati ve
judgments. whi ch have propos iti onal co ntent. is that they oft en moti vate our emotion al
reacti ons. If so meon e pushes me and I fall hard, my em otional response will depend on why
I was pu shed. If it was cl one to save me fro m dan ge r. I will fee l grateful: if it was cl one to hurt
me. I will fee l an gry. rese ntful. indi gnant. W hat emotion s we fee l in res ponse to the
sati sfa ction or breach of ex pectati ons may be largel y culturall y relati ve. but an e motion al
res ponse to normati ve j ud gment seems to be another omniprese nt aspec t o f human
intera cti on. Once again. a society in whi ch members did not have emutional re sponses to
norm ati ve j ud gments woul d not be recogni zabl y human.
In sum. creatures built like ourselves inev itabl y willli \e in group s th at have norm s. whi ch
in turn create ex pectations that generate emotional responses to their satisfacti on or breach. [t
is di fficult to im ag ine that these ge neral aspects of hum an life woulcl no/ ex ist unle ss human
co nsc iousness anc! the capac ity for emoti onal res ponse were radicall y altered ... Brave new
world .. ha sn· t arri ve d nor has anyo ne yet gi ve n an ul timatel y con vinc in g reason why we
sho uld has ten its arriva l-although many ha ve tri ed-so I propose for the no nce that vve tal\.e
ours elve s largely as we fin d us.
So far this abst ract story is largel y desc ripti ve. rooted in a loose. but not implau sibl e.
evo lut ionary biological acco unL and it does not co mmit anyone who be li ev~s it to an y specific
form of moral or political life. It co mmits one onl y to believin g that am ong human beings
there will inev itabl y be a mora l and political life . that there will be norms. nonnati ve
ex pec tation s. and reac tion s to th e satisfaction or breach of those ex pectati ons. It appli es
equall y \V ~II to any time and place within recorded hi story. and l suspec t that it ha s bee n tru e
sin ce homo sapiens fir st used lan guage to reg ul ate social life. I free ly co nl'ess that th e story is
a littl e bit .. esse ntiali st.. about human nature. but thi s essence . alth ough important, is not
te rribl y limi tin g. The story is also a .. determini st'. or .. uni ve rsa l cau sa ti on' · story, th at is. an
account th at assum es that what happened was the ou tco me of a la wl\!1 se t of ph ys ica l
processes ope1·atin g on antecedent co nditi ons.
At thi s point in the story. one might fairl y as l\. why any defe nse- a normati \'e tasl\.-o f
moral res ponsibility or an y other cultural artifact is nec essary if the determin is tic or universa l
cau sation acco unt is true. If. that is. what ex ists is th e outco me or ant ecedent eve nts anclthe
la\vs of th e uni ve rse operating on those eve nt s. then isn·t ir true th at no oth er outco me was
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possible? If so. an y evaluation or defense of "what is" is. itself. determini sticall y or causally
inevitable and also needs no defen se. Indeed. my students al ways ask just this question just
about now. Well. in my story. the answer is. yes and no.
Yes. it is true that culture and everything else are th e products of determini sti c or causal
processes, or some thing ve ry close to them. ' but. no, it does not follow th at cultural artifacts
cannot and should not be normatively evaluated. Permit me to share how I attempt to
demon strate thi s conclusion to my students. I wo rdl ess ly move to the desk at th e front of th e
class and then sit silently and as absolutely st ill as I can until the anxiety in the room builds
to uncomfortabl e levels. I then ask the students what I was doin g. They of course haven't a
clue about why their professo r behaves so bizarrely. The answer I give is this: ··I am waiting
for dete rmini sm to happen.'' They titter at th e abs urdity of the sta tement, and we ll they should.
Although the winds, tides, bacteria. and most non-human species do "wait'" for determini sm
to happen. human beings do not. We cannot help but consciously think. deliberate. reason. and
guide our actions by reaso ns. We' re stuck. It' s just th e way we are and th ere is no getting
around it. Some unforesee n bioph ysical calamity or new tec hn ologies might change our
nature. But short of such scary sce nario s. there is no alternati ve but to deliberate and to act
based on deliberation.
Eve n if our actions are dete rmin ed. they make a difference. Determined actions ca n cause
pleas ure or pain . ca n create wealth or poverty. ca n be kind or cruel. INe discu ss. argue. fight.
and eve n kill about morals and politics prec isely beca use the moral and political reg ime in
which we live makes an enormou s differen ce to our well-being and tlouri shing. Although we
may be determin ed creatures. we are not automatons. Determined deliberation and intentional
action are distingui shabl e from refl exive bodi ly move men ts. We ca n' t wait for determini sm to
happen. We determine what determinism di cta tes.
The tools we use to engage in such determ ined deliberation are given to us by our hi sto ry
and culture. but th e human capacity for rati onality and prac ti cal reason necessarily infects the
process eve rywh ere and always. How could anyon e eve r rati onally persuade anybody else
about anything. except by giving reasons'' Unle ss \VC are sati sfied to "conv ince" by force. all
that we have is reason. however fla wed it may be and howeve r ofte n it may lead us as tray. The
best we can do is to try to give good reason s and to yie ld to what seem to be better re aso ns
when they appea r. Although "reason" and "rati onality" are not self-definin g. uncontrovcrsiallyclefinecl te rm s, it is alm ost imposs ible to co nceive of a cu lture that will not inc lude among its
too ls some criteria for what co unts as good reaso n with in the cu lture. Arguments that are
logicall y sound- within defe nsible co nvent ions of logic-and factua lly acc urate- \vithin
defen sible epi stemological co nventi ons-sh ould yield on ly if they lead to a social and moral
regime that there is other. better reaso n to reject. J propose to use ord inary logic ami
common se nse rati onality- as th ey have bee n given to me and as th ey appear reaso na ble to
accept- to continue my sto ry. Anyone who objec ts needs to give me good reason not to an d
anyone who tri es to do so has already accepted th<:: most general claim being mad e.
It is impossible to den y that we hold eac h oth er mor;1 ll y acco untabl e ancl have a rich series
of pract ices th at retlect this response . But what arc we do in g vvhen we hold peop le morally
responsible for their conduct? A defens e of moral responsibility should begin with an
interpretation o i' our pract ices that answe rs this question. I have previously suggested that
human bei ng s possess the innate capac ity to respond emotio nal ly to nmmati ve j udg men ts.
Following Sir Peter Strawson an d more recen t Strawsonian s. es peci ally Jay Wallace. I
contend that holding peop le re sponsib le is an exp res sion of thi s capac it y: it is th e disposition
to fee l appropriate emoti ons when mora l expectat ions ar<:: sati sfi ed or breached and to ex press
those emotions in the appro pri ate way.; The content of the expectations . the ap propriate
emotions. ancl th e approp riate exp ress ion of them may vary. but this is the mean in g of the
abstraction. "to hold someone morall y respons ible ... In our culture . the co mm on emotional
responses to breach are rese ntment. indignation. and anger: the co mm on emotio nal response
to compliance is gratitude. Depending on the nature and magnitude of the expecta tion. the
appropriate express ions of the reac ti on to breac h can range from mild disapproval to painful
puni shment : th e appropriate express ions of the reacti on to compliance can range fro m mil d
approval to sub stantial rewa rds.
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The va riou s ways in whi ch the moral reacti ve emot ions can be expressed mu st be
normativel y ju stifi ed becau se they have th e pote ntial to create benetit or to cause harm. I say
thi s not as an assertion of the ore ti cal truth divorced from our practices. but as an express ion
of ou r internal pract ices. of what we req uire of eac h other morall y. As a gen eral ru le. benefit s
and harm s should not be awarded for ··no good reason··: there should be good reaso n among
creatures who se lf-consciou sly decide how they should live together. People should be praised
and bl amed. rewarded and puni shed. on ly if they deserve it, only if it is fair to respond in these
ways to thei r co nduct. To claim that reason should not gui de the di stribution of rewards and
harm s is to adopt an arati onal stance . But why should l or anyone else do this unle ss we are
give n good reason to do it'1
Moral expectations give people good reason to behave properl y. It is fair to ho ld people
to such expectat ion s only if they have the genera l capacity to grasp and be guid ed by reason.
If they are incapable of understa nding ex pectati ons or of using them in practical reasoning. it
would be unju stifi ed and unfair to prai se and bl ame th em for co mpliance and breach. Th us.
\Ve exempt people from moral responsib ility under two general conditi ons that indi cate th at
the agent cou ld not grasp or be guided by reason. The first is cases in which the agent ha s not
acted. that is. her movements did not meet the criteria for human act ion. Re fle xes an d other
physica ll y invo luntary bodi ly move ments are the prime ex amples. Th e sec ond is cases in
whic h the age nt ha s acted. but the ac ti on is exc used . Non-culpabl e ignorance. irration ality.
ancl com pul sion are classic exampl es.
Unde r either condition-no act ion or excu sed acti on- we do not th in k it is ju s til~ e d to
!"eel and exp ress what woul d otherwise be the appropri ate e mot ion fo r comp lian ce or breac h.
For examp le. if a driver has an unforeseeable se izure and blacks out. during which th e car
causes injury. we wo uld not just ifiably be angry at and sanction th e driver for the moral failure
to take care whiie ope rating a dangerou s machine. Or. under th e sa me circum stance s. if the
c~tr plows harmles sly into a haystac k. saving a passe nger from an otherwi se imminent but
unfo reseeab le crash with an approaching ve hi cle. the unco nsci ous dri ver does not dese rve
thanks fo r saving the passenger 's life.
Alt hou gh l have descri bed the practice of holding peop le morall y respo ns ible as a
predispos iti on to an emot iona l reaction and an ex press ion of that react ion. hol din g respon sibl e
1s n o t a purely emot ional res pon se . A mora l react ive emoti on and its ex press ion are
.tpp ropriatc onl y if a moral expectation was co mplied with or breac hed and the agent was
Ct]Xtbk or bei ng guided by re aso n. Th e criteria fo r mo r~tl expect~H ion s . act ion. and reas on may
be \ ~triable. but th ey are al ways propositi onal and ha ve truth \ ~tlue. Mo reove r. our pract ice of
holding peo pl e morall y responsib le is not simply an instrum ent al be hav iora l dispos iti o n to
emit responses that are mea nt to in crease or decrease the probab il ity that pa rti cular behavior
wil l occ ur in the futme. ' Holdin g peop le morall y re spo nsible ex presses a no rm ati ve .
re trospective evalu at ion of an agent 's conduct. inde pendent of whe th er that eva lu ation has
pos iti\·e or negative co nseq uen ces.
ln sum . the di spos ition to fee l appropriate emotion s w hen moral nmms are breac hed or
:<trisfied and th e consequ ent ex pressio ns of normati ve judgment atl irm and enfo rce the
ine\itable. :tecess~try norms of behavior that ex ist in hum an socie ty and that gi ve peopl e
; ·eas O ! l~ to ~ee l. Aft er all , the ele ments of nature. su ch as the w inds and the tide. and non- human
sp <~ cie s do nut need norm s or rul es of conduct to tell them how to behave . nor cl o we fee l
!llor ~tl emot ions towards th em. un less we anthropomorphi ze th em. I assume th at ex press in g
normative j ud gments and affirming an d enfo rcin g norm s co uld be acco mpl ished by mean s
utiler than holding peop le morall y respon sible. although I also cts su me that thi s vvo uld be a
di!'!"icul t tr ick to pull off. Co nsis tent \Vith thi s assu mption . however. the defe nse of
respon:;ibility will still requi re :.t story about why it is des irable-w hy. that is. hum~ln beings
sh ould rationally des ire to li ve in soc iet ies that hold peo ple re \pon sibl e for th eir in te ntional
,_·undue!.
Shoul d our conce pts and practices of mcmtl respo nsibilit y be maintained·' T he firs t li ne
o!' clttack is the fam ili ar one. alluclecl to ab(we. rooted in an xieti es abou r dete rmini sm or
uni ,"<::rsa! causatio n. I previously suggested th at va riou ,; inte rperso nal. socia l co nce pts and
;xac ti ces \verc real and coul cl be rati onally interpreted c\·e n if de terminism or uni ve rsa l
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causati on were true. Determinist critics of res ponsibility-so called ·'hard determini sts" or
··inco mpatibili sts"-can concede these points. but they argue nonethel ess that responsibility
isn't really rea l; it 's just a made-up , as-if fantas y. 5 Thu s, th ere is "nothing" desirable to
maintain , and it is entirely unfair to maintain prac ti ces dependent on such fant as ies . After all ,
if all eve nts in the uni verse are determin ed or cau sed products of antecedent events and laws
over which living human beings have no control, how can we possibly be responsible for
anythin g" Such critics believe that unless we have co ntra-cau sal freedom (or some such
thing)- the ability to act uncon strained by th e causal, determini stic processes of the
universe-then "real" responsibili ty is not poss ibl e. And neither, it mu st be co nceded if thi s
is correc t, are "real" justi ce and fairness poss ibl e, whi ch pres uppose ration al, responsible
respon ses of rational creatures to each other. If correct, thi s assertion of the in compatibility of
determini sm and responsibility (and justi ce) is powerful. because the metaph ys ics of co ntracaus al freedom are prepos terous, and in Strawson 's word, "panicky."
My acc ount of responsibility is compatibl e with the truth of determini sm or universal
causati on, however. Even if our behavior is determin ed, we are determined to have a
susceptibility to feel and express emotions in response to co mpli ance with or breach of moral
ex pectation s. and some hum an beings are capabl e of bein g guided by reason and others, such
as small children and some people with severe mental di sorder, are not. Responsibility does
not require god-like causal powers. It require s only th at mature human beings have the
general capacity to grasp and be guided by good reaso n." a capacity we firml y beli eve we
have. It is fair, we believe, to hold accountable anoth er person who is capabl e of reason , a
person who can use moral expectations as premi ses in practical reasoning. A perso n wh o
sutlers an unforeseen seizure may be causall y re spo nsibl e for harms th at result , but the perso n
does not deserve, in the full est sense, our co ndemn ation an d sancti on. Such a res ponse woul d
be unfa ir. If we didn't beli eve th at mature hum ans we re capable of grasping ancl being
intluenced and guided by reason . we woulcln·r be reading or writing articles like thi s o ne in
the hope of learning or being guided ourselve s or o f persuading or guidin g others . Few peopl e
read or write academi c articles solely for rec reati on or eve n ad va ncem ent.
If co ntra-cau sal freedom is necessary fo r .. real" ' res ponsibility-an asse rti on th at tlows
!'rom an ex ternal point of vi ew and critiqu e of rcspo nsibility'-then "real " responsibility does
not ex ist. but I deny that it is necessary. If we all had god-like powe rs. th en I suppose th at
there wo uld be no ques tion about res ponsibility. We arc not gods . of co urse, but in a sen se.
we arc god-like in th at we mu st create and do have th e capacity to rev ise our concepts and
practi ces. eve n if we lack co ntra-cau sal freedom. And th ose crea tion s arc '· real enough·· for
me. ew n if they lack the alle ged metaphys ical ped igree of contra-causal fre edo m.
Yes. we create and re vise our responsibilit y co ncepts and practi ces ove r and ove r again
as we go al ong. ju st as we do with th e co ncept of justi ce and its prac ti ces . But what we
co nstru ct is real. it ex presses our nature. and it ha s the all-too co ncrete potenti al to benefit or
harm us. to 2: ive our li ves more or less meanin 2: . or to ex tin 2: ui sh th ose li ves . The norm s o f
res ponsibility are li ke the rules or law. the de mand s of ju sti ce. and the in stituti ons of
gove rn me nt: all have the enormou s potenti al for good and ill. and th ey can be defend ed bes t
by the good reason that we can give for th em. rather than by a found ati onal meta phys ics .
Practi cal and theoreti cal reason is all th at we ha ve to dev ise and defe nd our conce pts an d
instituti ons. Give n the bi olog ical limits of our be in gs. what more co uld we rea listicall y and
reaso nabl y want'J
The retrospecti ve . evalu ative co ncept or mo ral re sponsibility that we now possess and
empl oy may be real enough. but is it des irabl e·) T he seco nd line o f attack on res ponsibility
suggests that it is an irrati onal conce pt. lf one !'uncti on of moral respo nsibility is to gui de
interperso nal li fe. then perhaps. as many ha ve sugges ted. we co uld replace it. for exampl e.
with a purely pros pec tive . purely conseq ucnti a li st sc heme.' But in additi on to bein g
inadequate in te rpretati ons of current concepts and prac tices ( W~1llac e S..J.-6). abandoning our
curre nt co ncep t and prac ti ces would not be rati o nal beca use it wo uld impove ri sh our li ves.
Retrospec ti ve. evaluati ve moral responsibili ty is cru cial to our se nse of ourse lves as
persons. as objec ts of dignity and res pect. and it co heres with oth er moral noti ons of supreme
im portance . such as desert. fairn ess. and j us ti ce . to whi ch we are firml y co mmitted. 'Wha t
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makes us di stin ctive ly human and what gives all these co ncep ts full meaning is our capacity
for reaso n. vvhich in turn make s us capable of ge nuine normative eva lu at ion and appropriate
objects of such evaluat io n. Other sentient creatures can suffer and deserve to be treated
without unn ecessary pain, but we are the only creatures capable of leading full y moral li ves.
Thi s is why. I believe. we think of ourselves as occu pying a uniqu e position among the life
forms on earth and it is a fo undati onal part of what gives our lives dignity. meaning, and
worth. To give up thi s sense of ourselves would abandon our humanity.
Responsibility is desirable also because it contributes to the creation and maintenan ce of
moral communities. Personhood, desert, and re spo nsi bility are all moral noti ons. inextri cabl y
intertwined in ou r moral li ves . When we express the reacti ve emoti ons through appropriate
practices, we atlirm and deepen our commitment to commo n moral obligati ons that bind us
toge ther. To dimini sh or to abandon moral responsibility would be to weaken those ties and
the comm uniti es that nurture us. Creatures capabl e of graspin g and being guided by good
reason deserve our moral praise when they compl y with our moral expectati ons . and they
deserve our bl ame when th ey tran sgress . To make thi s cl aim doe s no t commit one to any
concrete sc heme of expectati ons, rewards. and sancti o ns. It simpl y co mmits one to the
re cog nition that we are the onl y creatures capable of being guided by reason and th at this is
an inev itable. cruci al feature of our soci al li ves .
Many people object to holding people morally respon sibl e. for fea r that thi s practice
readily produce s moralistic. puniti ve. and cruel res pon ses . at least whe n ex pectations are
breac hed . It is of co urse true that when human beings are angry because they have been
harmed . they can become incredibl y self-ri ghteous and hideously cruel. Holdin g people
morally accountabl e can be used to satisfy such unworthy res ponse s, but thi s is not inherent
in the practice. Virtuall y any human practice can be turn ed to vic ious use. but nothing in my
story co mpels moral responsibility to be appli ed harshl y. l'vl y account is co nsistent w ith a
tender, fo rgiving. or conve rse ly. a tough. stri ct set of norms and practice s, and neit her ne ed be
cruel. It pres upposes on ly that it is fair to hold acco untab le beings th at reason and th at are
capabl e. as mo st adults demon st rabl y are. of being guided by good reason .
Another conception of human life is. [ suppose. possible. Fo r examp le. we could treat
each other like bacteri a. 1 refer to thi s as the good bacteri a/bad bacteria part of the story. Some
bacte ria that inhabit our gastrointestinal system. our gut. are cruc ial to the smooth o perati o n
of the sys tem. T hey are the good bac teria. We try to enh ance their su rvi va l ancl do nothing to
inhibit their grow th . On occasio n. alas . our guts are in vaded by bac teria tha t interfere with th e
proper operati o n or the system. cau sing variou s un seeml y ailments. and in extreme cases.
de at h. These arc th e bad bacteria . We spend a fair amount of· effort tryi ng to preve nt these
critters from ente rin g our gut in suffi cient numbers to ove rwhelm the body"s natural defe nses.
ancl if the natural defen ses fa il. we try with vari ous techn iq ues. such as antibioti cs. to kill th e
offe nsive . bad bacteria. Now. des pite th e potential of various bacteria to confer benefits and
harm s. as the case may be . and despite our co nseq uential. substantial e fforts ro dea l with these
bacteria. no one holds either kind of bacteri a respon sible for smooth or rocky gastrointe stin al
runcti o ning. and \\'e wou ld n' t dream of prai sing or blaming bacteria. We treat bac teria purely
as objects. and never as subjects. as agents.
We could. by an al ogy. sim ply treat each other like bacteria. as potentiall y benefici al or
harmfui objec ts. and ac t acco rdin gly. Thi s conception of peop le would su pport a purely
predicti ve and pre vc nti\'C scheme of soc ial org ani zatio n in whi ch the emo ti onal and soc ietal
respon se to the organ ism coul d be entirely independent of the moral goodn ess or badness of
the perso n·s cond uct. We don' t at present have the emotion al repe rtoire or th e predi ctive and
therapeuti c techn ology to institute thi s vision very prec ise ly or crrective ly. but this is a
technoquibblc. Tn principle. it is a possible form of soc ial orga ni zati on. Indeed. in some senses
we mi ght all be "safe r: · and . to so me. social life might appear mo1·e rational if the show ran
along these lines. But thi s is a show that I think virtu all y an y of us would happil y mi ss.
prec isely becau se we are importantl y different from bacteria. They are not moral creatures.
At th is sta ge in the story. 1 am appealing as much to ~~ \ isio n as to J logic al arg um ent.
Why wo uld a rational agent wish to give up a concep tion of self as a moral creat ure·) No one
would do th is. fo r ex am ple. just because determini sm were true. A rati onal age nt wo uld clo it
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on ly if it promoted some vision of human flourishing the agent was willing to defend. If you
are still convinced that moral responsibility contributes little and should be abandoned, try the
following thought experiments. Imagine, first, that someone intentionally injures you,
knowing that yo u are incapable of retaliating, because the person enjoys your pain and the
feeling of dominanc e that cruelty produce s. You of course reac t not only by feeling pain. but
surely with anger. too. Your physical pain is no worse than it would be if an accident of nature
had caused it. but your entire reac ti on is quite different. Do yo u rea ll y want to treat the bully
as if she were just a larger ·'bad bacteria'"' Should yo ur res ponse be simply that which most
decreases the likelihood that the bully would strike again'' Do you think you (and others)
could lea rn not to feel indignation, resentment. and anger, as opposed to reg ret '~ Would we all
be better off if we no longer had these reactions and expressed them to each oth e r '~ Would life
th en be more rational ') Better? Would human nouri shing increase')
Now imagine that rou have unju stifiably injured another person. Probabl y, in additi on to
whatever "positive'· emotion is created, you will al so feel guilt or shame or some other critical
emotion. But how should you feel about yo urself'/ If yo u promi se not to do it again and really,
really mean it, should that be the end of the matter'' Of course. unpleasant emotions like guilt
or sham e may decrease the likelihood that yo u will cause such injury again , but should that
be the onl y point of these em o ti o n s'~ How should the victim feel about yo u'' Is rese ntment and
condemnation just irrational or silly, especially if you prom ise to be a good bacterium from
novv on ') Finally. imag ine that we all learned our lesson and ceased to have these irrational
responses to violations of moral expectations. What wo uld soc iety be like'~ How wo uld we
feel about ourse lves and each other? What would be the role of community or the arts in such
a society')
My story has neither a happy nor a sad endin g. We are in the mid st of the story and have
no idea wheth er or how it will end. Human social life will surely end only when human beings
cease to ex ist as a spec ies in its current form. As long as recog ni za ble humans ex ist. however.
they will create meaning and norm s from th e cultural too ls and co ncepts available to them.
And hi sto ry and anthropology teach us that incred ible diversity is poss ible. We ca nn ot even
predict that there vvi II be prog ress. Progress is itse lf a soc ial! y constmctecl moral notion.
subject to diverse interpretations.
If- and thi s is a bi g ·'if'- we insist on trying to subjec t our co ncepts and practices to
reason. our capacity for reaso n surely sets so me limits on what co ncepts and tools a society
can clclop t that will rema in relatively stable. Now. of course. one can claim that reason is not
th e road to moral or any other kind of progress and th at it is a mi stake to try to subj ect our
lives to th e di ctates of good reason. But th e only reaso n an yone sho uld accept such a claim is
because the claimant gives good reaso n to abandon reason. Force and th e threat of force are.
of co urse . good instrumental reason s to yie ld to a stronger opponen t-infrahuman spec ies do
this all th e time-but fear is not. in itself. a good moral reason for action.
No culture ex ists or changes without indi vidual agenh to perpetuate. critici ze and mod ify
it. Surely no cu lture chang es unl ess individuals believe that it should and th en act on that
belief. We are all the creators as we ll as the consumers of our culture. As such. we are all
storytellers as we ll as characters in the story. 'vVe have been born in a tim e and place in which
we ha ve been taught to tru st reason, to hope for rationality and obj ectiv ity. Although we
sho uld not make reaso n a feti sh. we ignore it at our peril. Because our norms and rul es mu st
be expressed in lan guage . there will al ways be ambigui ty and roo m for interpreta ti on ancl
argum entation. There will neve r be absolute agreem ent on what reason demands. even among
people who share the same ends and the sa me vision of human flourishing. The best we ca n
do is to give eac h other the best reasons we can for why we shou ld li ve together one way
rather than an other. why we should prefer one set of norms. rul es and in stituti ons to others.
ancl try to li sten to others' reasons as openl y as poss ible.
Wh ether or not taking moral respo nsibility seriously is a given of interperso nal life. it is
fair and fundamentall y enhan ces personhood. di gnity and res pect. It al so fa cilitates the
formati on and maintenance of moral co mmuniti es. These goa ls are so important that it is hare!
to imagine giving th em up , at least not until som eo ne gives us goocl reason that we should.
And. if th e relatio n between res ponsibility and th ese othe r end s is as close as it appears to be.
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it is hard to imagine what reasons would pe rsuade us to abandon respon s ibility. If yo u w ish
to give it up, assuming that it is po ss ibl e to do thi s, what social concepts an d prac tic es do you

propose to adopt instead to respond to the good and ev il we do to each othe r, to the inte nti onal
acts o f kindness and cruelty of interpersonal life? What kind of soc iety w ill it be? Tell us a
story that give s us good re ason to hear it ag ain.
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